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Abstract—We have witnessed rapid advances in both face
presentation attack models and presentation attack detection
(PAD) in recent years. When compared with widely studied 2D
face presentation attacks, 3D face spoofing attacks are more
challenging because face recognition systems (FRS) are more
easily confused by the 3D characteristics of materials similar
to real faces. In this work, we tackle the problem of detecting
these realistic 3D face presentation attacks, and propose a
novel anti-spoofing method from the perspective of fine-grained
classification. Our method, based on factorized bilinear coding of
multiple color channels (namely MC FBC), targets at learning
subtle visual differences between real and fake images. By
extracting discriminative and fusing complementary information
from RGB and YCbCr spaces, we have developed a principled
solution to 3D face spoofing detection. A large-scale wax figure
face database (WFFD) with both still and moving wax faces has
also been collected as super-realistic attacks to facilitate the study
of 3D face PAD. Extensive experimental results show that our
proposed method achieves the state-of-the-art performance on
both our own WFFD and other face spoofing databases under
various intra-database and inter-database testing scenarios.
Index Terms—Wax figure face, presentation attack detection,
face recognition, biometrics spoofing, anti-spoofing.
I. INTRODUCTION
FACE has been one of the most widely-used biometricmodalities due to its accuracy and convenience for per-
sonal verification and identification. However, the increasing
popularity and easy accessibility of face modalities make
face recognition systems (FRS) a major target of spoofing
such as presentation attacks [1]. This class of security threats
can be easily implemented by presenting the FRS a face
artifact, which is also known as presentation attack instrument
(PAI) [2]. A recent breach of biometrics database (BioStar)
leads to the compromise of as many as 28 million records
containing facial and fingerprint data, which can be exploited
by malicious hackers as PAIs.
Based on the way of generating face artifacts, face presen-
tation attacks can be classified into 2D (e.g., printed/digital
photographs or recorded videos on mobile devices such as
a tablet) and 3D (e.g., by wearing a mask or presenting a
synthetic model). Existing research on FRS has paid more
attention to 2D face PAI due to its simplicity, efficiency,
and low cost. However, as material science and 3D printing
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Fig. 1. Examples of 3D presentation attack cases. (a) Airport security system
fooled by silicon mask1, (b) Android phones fooled by a 3D-printed head2,
(c) iPhone X face ID unlocked by a 3D mask3.
technology advance, creating face-like 3D structures or mate-
rials has become easier and more affordable. When compared
against 2D attacks, 3D face presentation attacks are more
realistic and therefore more difficult to be detected. The class
of 3D face presentation attacks includes wearing wearable
facial masks [3], building 3D facial models [4], through facial
make-up [5], and using plastic surgery. Fig. 1 shows several
examples of 3D presentation attacks, which have successfully
fooled some widely used FRS in practice.
The vulnerability of current face recognition systems to
realistic face presentation attacks has facilitated a series of
studies on 3D face presentation attack detection (PAD) [6]. Ex-
isting methods tried to explore the difference between the real
face skin and 3D fake face materials based on the reflectance
properties using multispectral imaging [7], [8], texture anal-
ysis [9], [10], deep features [11], [12], or liveness cues [13],
[14]. They have achieved promising detection performance on
several existing 3D face spoofing databases [3], [15], [16],
[17]. However, since facial masks are often made of paper,
latex or silicone materials, these 3D face spoofing databases
have the limitations of small database size (mostly less than 30
subjects), poor authenticity (some based on 2D planar or using
non-customized masks [16], [18]), and low diversity in subject
and recording process, which might impede the development
of effective and practical PAD schemes. Several studies [6],
[19], [20], [21] have shown that a variety of 3D PAD methods
suffer from performance degradation on databases with more
diverse and realistic 3D face spoofing attacks.
In this work, we aim at detecting realistic 3D face spoofing
1Picture is downloaded from https://chameleonassociates.com/security-
breach/.
2Picture is downloaded from http://www.floridaforensicscience.com/broke-
bunch-android-phones-3d-printed-head/.
3Picture is downloaded from https://boingboing.net/2010/11/05/young-
asian-refugee.html.
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Fig. 2. Photos with wax figure faces for fraud. In 2012, six suspects snapped
about 600,000 people out of nearly US$475 million under a pyramid sales
scam using photos taken with the wax figures at Hong Kongs Madam Tussauds
Museum, (a) with the wax figure of chief executive Donald Tsang Yam-Kuen,
(b) with the wax figure of business tycoon Li Ka-Shing.
attacks which often pose greater threats to existing FRS (even
with face anti-spoofing modules) than their 2D counterparts.
Based on the fact that wax figure faces have already been used
for identity personation and fraud in the real world (as shown
in Fig. 2), we first collect a large number of wax figure images
as super-realistic 3D face spoofing attacks by expanding upon
our preliminary work [22]. Inspired by the latest advances in
intelligent wax figures, we also generate moving wax figure
videos based on two classes of image manipulation tools
including Deepfake4 and 3D Face Reconstruction [23]. Fur-
thermore, we propose to treat realistic face spoofing detection
as a special class of fine-grained image classification problems
which focus on differentiating between hard-to-distinguish
object classes. Then we introduce a new bilinear coding
based method with state-of-the-art performance of combin-
ing features for fine-grained classification, which generates
discriminative representations for 3D face anti-spoofing. The
main contributions of this work are summarized below.
• We expand the wax figure faces in [22] in terms of quan-
tity and quality. A large-scale wax figure face database
(WFFD) with 2300 pairs of images from 745 subjects
(totally 4600 faces) is constructed as super-realistic 3D
face presentation attack. Based on this new dataset, we
have developed more challenging spoofing attacks with
moving wax figure faces (200 videos).
• A new 3D face anti-spoofing method, named MC FBC,
is proposed based on factorized bilinear coding from
multi-color channels. This is the first work addressing
the problem of detecting realistic face PAD in a fine-
grained manner and use bilinear coding to improve the
discriminative power of feature representations.
• We have conducted extensive experiments on the pro-
posed WFFD and several publicly available databases.
Our findings show that the proposed method outperforms
several state-of-the-art methods under both intra- and
inter-database testing scenarios.
II. RELATED WORK
A. 3D Face PAD methods
Detection of 3D fake faces is often more challenging than
detecting fake faces with 2D planar surfaces. Existing PAD
4Deepfakes: github.https://github.com/deepfakes/ faceswap.
methods for 3D face presentation attacks, mainly based on
the difference between real face skin and mask material, can
be broadly classified into five categories- namely, reflectance-
based, texture-based, shape-based, liveness-based, and deep
features-based.
Earlier studies [24], [25], [26] in 3D mask spoofing de-
tection were based on the reflectance difference of facial
skins and mask materials. For example, the distribution of
albedo values for illumination of various wavelengths was
first analyzed in [24] to find how different facial skins and
mask materials (silicon, latex, and skinjell) behave in terms of
reflectance. Texture-based methods explore the texture pattern
difference of real faces and masks with the help of texture
feature descriptors, such as the widely used Local Binary
Patterns (LBP) [3], [27], Binarized Statistical Image Features
(BSIF) [28], and Haralick features [9]. These methods are easy
to implement, but their robustness to different mask spoofing
attacks calls for further investigations.
Shape-based 3D mask PAD methods use shape descrip-
tors [29], [30], [31] or 3D reconstruction [10] to extract
discriminative features from faces and 3D masks. Different
from reflectance-based or texture-based detection methods,
these schemes only require standard color images without the
need of special sensors. However, their detection performances
rely on the qualities of 3D mask attacks, and may not be
roust to super-realistic 3D face presentation attacks. More
recently, some methods explore liveness cues to detect 3D
face presentation attacks, such as thermal signatures [32], gaze
information [33], [34], and pulse or heartbeat signals [19],
[35], [36], [37]. Based on intrinsic liveness signals, these
methods achieve outstanding performance on distinguishing
real faces from masks.
Instead of extracting hand-crafted features, deep feature
based methods automatically extract features from face im-
ages. Two deep representation approaches were investigated
in [38] for detecting spoofing in different biometric modalities.
Image quality cues (Shearlet) and motion cues (dense optical
flow) were fused in [39] using a hierarchical neural network
for mask spoofing detection, which achieved a Half Total Error
Rate (HTER) of 0% on the 3DMAD database. A network
based on transfer learning using a pre-trained VGG-16 model
architecture is presented in [40] to recognize photo, video
and 3D mask attacks. Based on the observation with the
importance of dynamic facial texture information, a deep
convolutional neural network based approach was developed
in [20]. Both intra-dataset and cross-dataset evaluation on
3DMAD and their supplementary dataset indicated the effi-
ciency and robustness of the proposed method.
B. 3D Face Spoofing Databases
Existing 3D face spoofing databases create attacks mainly
based on wearable 3D face masks that are made of material
with face characteristics similar to real faces. 3DMAD [3]
is the first publicly available 3D mask database. It used
the services of ThatsMyFace5 to manufacture 17 masks of
users, and recorded 255 video sequences with an RGB-D
5http://thatsmyface.com/
3Fig. 3. 3D mask spoofing examples in existing databases. (a) 3DMAD, (b)
3DFS-DB, (c) HKBU-MARs, (d) SMAD,(e) WMCA.
camera of Microsoft Kinect device for both real access and
presentation attacks. With the development of 3D modeling
and printing technologies, more mask databases have been
created since 2016. 3DFS-DB [41] is a self-manufactured
and gender-balanced 3D face spoofing database, in which 26
printed models were made using two 3D printers. HKBU-
MARs [15], [19] is another 3D mask spoofing database
with more variations. It generated customized masks from
two companies (ThatsMyFace and REAL-F6), and created
videos from 12 subjects. To include more subjects, SMAD
database [16] has collected videos of people wearing silicone
masks from online resources. It contains 65 genuine videos
of people auditioning, interviewing, or hosting shows, and 65
imposter videos of people wearing a complete 3D (but not
customized) mask which fits well with proper holes for the
eyes and mouth.
For effective detection, more 3D face spoofing databases
provide multi-modality spoofing samples under special light-
ing conditions. The BRSU Skin/Face/Spoof Database [26]
provides multispectral SWIR (Short Wave Infrared) and RGB
color images for various types of masks and facial disguises.
The MLFP database [18] is another multispectral database
using latex and paper masks. It contains 1350 videos of 10
subjects in visible, near infrared (NIR), and thermal spectrums.
The ERPA database [32] provides RGB and NIR images of
both bona fide and 3D mask attack presentations captured
using special cameras. This is a small dataset with only 5
subjects involved. Both rigid resin-coated masks and flex-
ible silicone masks are considered. Similarly, the recently
released WMCA database [17] used multiple capturing de-
vices/channels, including color, depth, thermal and infrared.
It contains 1679 videos with 347 bona fide and 1332 attacks
from 72 subjects; among them, 709 3D face spoofing attack
videos include fake head, rigid mask, flexible silicone masks,
and paper masks. The 3DMA [42] also collects 920 videos
captured in both visual and NIR modalities from 67 subjects.
These databases have played a significant role in design-
ing multiple detection schemes against 3D face presentation
attacks. However, the following issues have remained to be
addressed: (1) only a small number of 3D spoofing samples are
collected due to the difficulty and expense of mask production;
(2) most of the 3D face spoofing attacks are in low qualities
(e.g., using noncustomized masks [16], [18] or 2D cut-out
6http://real-f.jp/en the-realface.html
paper masks [18], [43]. Although soft/flexible masks are closer
to real faces, they are still easy to be recognized by humans [3],
[15], [17], [41] (as shown in Fig. 3); (3) they contain less
variations to simulate the real world scenarios in terms of
recording cameras, lighting settings, subject pose/age, and
facial expression/resolution. To address these limitations, we
first introduced wax figure faces as super-realistic 3D face
spoofing attacks in [22] (with 4400 faces). After that, Vareto
et al. [44] collected a wax figure database named SWAX with
1800 faces and 110 videos from 55 people/waxworks.
III. WAX FIGURE FACE DATABASE
In this section, we introduce a super-realistic Wax Figure
Face Database (WFFD) to address the weaknesses in existing
3D face spoofing databases. Considering the high difficulty
and expense in generating a large number of 3D wax figure
faces, we take advantage of the popularity and publicity of
numerous celebrity wax figure museums in the world, and
collect as many wax figure images as possible from online
resources to construct such a database with a large size and
diversity. These wax figure faces are all carefully designed
and made in clay with wax layers, silicone or resin materials,
so that they are super-realistic and similar to real faces. In
physical domain, the attacker may fool the FRS using just
the life-size wax heads, which can be obained with relatively
low cost (about 200 dollars) from online shopping websites
(such as eBay US and Taobao China). Inspired by the recent
development of high-tech wax figure technologies in making
intelligent wax figures, we have also generated moving wax
figure videos with the help of latest image manipulation
technologies.
A. Wax figure face database with still images
Our previous work [22] has been greatly expanded in
order to qualify wax figure faces as super-realistic 3D face
spoofing attacks. We have thoroughly cleaned the dataset and
removed images with tiny faces or low qualities due to lossy
compression, and then added 100 new pairs of images from
75 subjects to the new database. Finally, a total of 2300 pairs
of images (4600 faces with both real and wax figure faces) of
745 subjects are collected (refer to [22]). We have followed the
three protocols designed in [22], including Protocol I with wax
figure faces and real faces grouped from different devices and
environmental conditions (e.g., Fig. 4(a)), Protocol II with wax
figure and real faces recorded in the same environment with
the same camera (e.g., Fig. 4(b)), and Protocol III combining
the previous two protocols to simulate real-world operational
scenarios. Table I provides the details about the statistics of
images in each protocol.
The statistical information about subject gender, age, eth-
nicity (detected by Face++7 ), and face resolution (cropped by
the dlib face detector [45]) in the WFFD is shown in Fig. 5.
It can be seen that images in the WFFD are relatively gender
balanced - with about 60% of male and 40% of female in
both protocols. The ethnicity distribution in Fig. 5(b) contains
a majority of White subjects (around 60%), followed by about
7https://www.faceplusplus.com/face-compare-sdk/
4Fig. 4. Examples in the WFFD database. (a) in Protocol I, (b) in Protocol
II. Note that one subject may have several wax figures in each protocol.
TABLE I
DETAILS OF EACH PROTOCOL IN THE WFFD
Protocol
#Image
#Face #SubjectTrain Valid Test Total
Protocol I 600 200 200 1000 2000 462
Protocol II 780 260 260 1300 2600 409
Protocol III 1380 460 460 2300 4600 745
Note that the train, validation, and test subsets are non-overlapped.
20% Asians and 10% Blacks, and a small percentage of
Indians (no more than 2%). We can also see a wide distribution
of ages in Fig. 5(c). The two protocols have similar distribution
patterns in terms of age, with half subjects being between
30 and 50 years old. Although the dimensions of most face
regions are between 100× 100 and 500× 500, there is a big
difference in the distribution between the first two protocols.
Matched and grouped manually, the dimensions of face regions
in Protocol I are generally larger than those in Protocol II.
Additionally, images in Protocol I are more diversified in terms
of subject pose, facial expression, recording environment and
devices than those in Protocol II.
B. Moving wax figures via image manipulation tools
Inspired by the new-generation animatronic models [46]
based wax figures which can move and interact with visitors
(like the one unveiled by Madame Tussaud in Shanghai in
2018), we have further generated live animations from wax
figures in WFFD to help make them look a lot more realistic.
Different from direct recording videos of wax figures in [44],
where wax figure faces are still static, we propose to simulate
more intelligent wax figures that can even shake the head,
blink, or move the mouth. There are two ways of making wax
figures ‘alive’.
1) Deepfake-based. DeepFake is an artificial intelligence
(AI)-based video manipulation method [47], which involves
replacing the face of one person in the source video with
another person’s face. We propose to take advantage of this
highly realistic manipulation tool to simulate moving wax
figure face videos by replacing real faces in videos with the
wax figure faces in WFFD. The complete process of Deepfake-
based moving wax figure face generation is shown in Fig. 6.
2) 3D reconstruction-based. Different from video manip-
ulation techniques like Deepfakes, 3D face reconstruction
methods can be used to generate realistic and multi-pose wax
Fig. 5. Statistical distribution of the WFFD. (a) Gender, (b) ethnicity, (c) age,
(d) face resolution.
Fig. 6. Block diagram of Deepfake-based moving wax figure face generation.
figure faces by recovering 3D facial geometry from 2D images
based on depth estimation. Working with just a single 2D facial
image, the 3D face reconstruction method via direct volumetric
CNN regression [23] has achieved good reconstruction quality.
Using this method, we have generated several high quality
animations from 2D faces in the WFFD following the process
shown in Fig. 7.
We have generated a total of 75 videos based on Deepfake
technology and 125 videos based on 3D face reconstruction
from still images in the WFFD. Note that we do not mean to
use these generated videos as direct face presentation attacks
(as replayed video attacks do), we aim at simulating the
intelligent moving wax figure faces which is in a small number
now but will be the future trend and more challenging to be
distinguished from real faces. We have also collected 110 real
face videos (the control group) to compose the final wax figure
face video database, named WFFD-V. All real and fake videos
are between 60 and 400 frames in length. More details of the
WFFD-V with 310 gender-balanced videos are included into
Table II. They are randomly partitioned into non-overlapped
training, validation, and testing subsets (with 150, 80, and 80
videos, respectively) for performance evaluation.
IV. 3D FACE ANTI-SPOOFING BASED ON FACTORIZED
BILINEAR CODING
With materials and shapes highly similar to real faces, 3D
face spoofing attacks may lead to performance degradation of
existing face PAD methods. To detect realistic 3D spoofing
attacks, we propose to explore their subtle differences from
5Fig. 7. Block diagram of 3D construction based moving wax figure face
generation.
TABLE II
DETAILS OF VIDEOS IN THE WFFD-V.
Video #Subject #Video #Frame
F M Total F M Total
Deepfakes 15 18 33 34 41 75 7403
3D Re
-construction
40 65 105 52 73 125 20466
Real 41 59 100 44 60 110 22370
F denotes Female, and M denotes Male.
real faces based on generating discriminative features in a fine-
grained manner. Bilinear pooling [48], originally proposed for
visual recognition, is leveraged to face anti-spoofing due to
its superiority in exploiting higher-order information among
complementary features. In this section, we will first construct
complementary features in color spaces and then present
a method of factorized bilinear coding combining features
extracted in different color spaces.
A. Multiple color spaces
Color spaces play an important role in image processing
and computer vision applications. RGB is the most widely
used color space for sensing, representing, and displaying
color images. However, due to the high correlation among the
three color components (red, green and blue), RGB color space
representation is not necessarily the most appropriate choice
for face anti-spoofing. Alternative color-space representations
such as luminance/chrominance and hue/saturation are also
valid and competing choices. Instead of fusing features from
a single RGB color space as most previous bilinear pooling
schemes [48], [49], [50], [51] did, we propose to take multiple
color spaces into account and extract more discriminative
features by combining multi-color space representations for
3D face anti-spoofing.
More specifically, we propose to consider two complemen-
tary representations: YCbCr space vs. RGB space. YCbCr
color space encodes a color image similar to human eyes’
retina, which separates the RGB components into luminance
component (Y) and two chrominance components (Cb as blue
projection and Cr as red projection; for an analog version, as U
and V, respectively). YCbCr space is effective for color feature
extraction, and has also achieved promising performance in
face related applications (e.g., 2D face spoofing detection [52]
and skin classification [53]). Considering the high similarity
between 3D face spoofing attacks and real faces, we propose
to take both RGB and YCbCr color spaces of the face image
as the input of CNN-based feature extraction module to obtain
complementary facial color texture descriptions.
B. Factorized bilinear coding
Bilinear pooling was introduced in [48] to provide robust
image representations for fine-grained image classification. In
bilinear pooling models, two feature vectors are fused by
outer product (or Kroneker product for matrices); this way, all
pairwise interactions among the given features are considered
as follows:
Z =
∑
(i,j∈S)
xiy
>
j (1)
where {xi|xi ∈ Rp, i ∈ S}, {yj |yj ∈ Rq, j ∈ S} are two in-
put features, S is the set of spatial locations (combinations of
rows and columns), and Z ∈ Rp×q is the fused feature descrip-
tor. It can be seen that the size of bilinear feature descriptor
can be huge, which make it computationally infeasible. To
generate more compact representations, we have employed the
factorized bilinear coding (FBC) [51] to more computationally
efficiently integrate the features from both RGB and YCbCr
color spaces for 3D face anti-spoofing.
Let xi, yj be the two features extracted from RGB and
YCbCr color spaces, respectively, the FBC encodes the fea-
tures based on sparse coding, and learns a dictionary B with k
atoms that are factorized into low-rank matrices to capture the
structure of the whole data space. Specifically, let the dictio-
nary B = [b1, b2, ..., bk] ∈ Rpq×k, FBC proposes to factorize
each dictionary atom bl ∈ Rpq(1 ≤ l ≤ k) into UlV >l , where
Ul ∈ Rp×r and Vl ∈ Rq×r are learnable low-rank matrices
(as the hyper-parameter rank r  p, q). Therefore, the original
bilinear feature xiy>j can be reconstructed by
k∑
l=1
clvUlV
>
l ,
with cv ∈ Rk being the FBC code, and clv being the l-th
element of cv (1 ≤ v ≤ N , N is the number of pairs in S).
Then the sparsity-based FBC encodes the two input fetures
(xi,yj) into cv by solving the following optimization problem
min
cv
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣xiy>j − k∑
l=1
clvUlV
>
l
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣2 + λ||cv||1 (2)
where λ is a trade-off parameter between the reconstruction
error and the sparsity. To obtain the FBC code cv , the classic
LASSO method [54] has been adopted as shown in Eq. (3).{
c′v = P (U˜>xi ◦ V˜ >yj),
cv = sign(c
′
v) ◦max((abs(c′v)− λ2 ), 0).
(3)
where ◦ denotes the Hadamard product, P ∈ Rk×rk is a
fixed binary matrix with only elements in the row l, columns
((l − 1)r + 1) to (lr) being “1”, and U˜ and V˜ are the
transformations of U and V to avoid matrix inversion with
heavy computation in the original LASSO method. They are
6Fig. 8. Flowchart of the proposed MC FBC scheme for 3D face anti-spoofing. MM module refers to ’Matrix Multiplication’, and HP module refers to
’Hadamard Product’ operation.
in the form of{
U˜> = [U˜>l ] = [
1
r · I((ql1>rk) ◦U>)] ∈ Rrk×p
V˜ > = [V˜ >l ] = [
1
r · IV >] ∈ Rrk×q
(4)
where I ∈ Rr×rk is an all “1” matrix, ql is the l-th column
of Q = ((P (U>UP> · V >V P>))−1P )>.
With Eq. (3), the FBC code cv can be obtained by learning
U˜ and V˜ instead of U and V . We can get all FBC codes c in
feature pair set S; then they are fused using the max operation
to attain the final global representation z = max {cv}Ni=1.
The FBC module is applied on the features extracted by
the last convolutional layer of a CNN (e.g. VGG), then
followed by a fully-connected (FC) layer for classification
using Softwax classifier. The whole process of the proposed
MC FBC scheme is shown in Fig. 8.
C. Loss Functions
To train the network, we utilize the focal loss function [55]
which reshapes the standard cross entropy loss in such a way
that the loss assigned to well-classified examples in binary
classification is down-weighted. There are two compelling rea-
sons for such choice of loss function: 1) the higher similarity
of real faces and realistic 3D spoofing attacks in 3D face
spoofing will lead to harder examples with large errors while
the local loss function focuses on training on hard negatives
and reducing the loss contribution from easy examples; 2)
most 3D face spoofing databases have the problem of class
imbalance (e.g., more real samples than fake ones due to the
difficulty with collecting 3D spoofing attacks at a large scale).
Overall, our scheme is different from [51] in the following
two aspects. First, to get more discriminative color features,
we extract features from two different complementary color
spaces. Such diversity in terms of feature representation is
important to 3D face anti-spoofing which is sometimes even
challenging for human-based inspection. Second, we replace
the original cross-entropy loss function with the robust focal
loss function to train the network. Originally designed for
dense object detection in [55], we have found that in the
scenario of anti-spoofing where training on a sparse set of hard
examples is common, it is important to prevent the majority of
easy negatives from dominating the detector. Such observation
contributes to the improved training performance of new loss
function over traditional ones.
V. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we conduct extensive experiments to evaluate
our method. We first explore the influence of color spaces on
detection performance using super-realistic 3D face spoofing
database. Different feature fusion schemes are then compared
with our MC FBC method. Then we present the comparison
results under intra-database testing on the WFFD database
and several 2D/3D face spoofing databases, and finally the
performance under inter-database testing is evaluated to show
the generalizability of the proposed method.
A. Experimental settings
1) Implementation: Two backbone networks were used to
extract features for the FBC module in our experiment: a
relatively small VGG-16 model [56] (as used in bilinear
pooling based classification methods [48], [49], [51]) and
ResNet-50 [57] (deeper and more accurate). The last pooling
layer and the fully-connected layers were removed in both
networks. The learnable parameters U˜ and V˜ were updated
by the back-propagation algorithm to get the FBC code. We
set the rank of U˜ and V˜ as one, the number of dictionary
atoms k as 2048, and λ as 0.001 (according to [51]). As for
the training parameters, we fine-tuned the model using SGD
with an initial learning rate of 0.01 (decreased by a factor of
10 for every 40 epochs until it reaches 0.0001), weight decay
as 5×10−4, momentum as 0.9, and batch size as 16 for VGG
model and 8 for ResNet-50 model. The weighting factor and
tunable focusing parameter in focal loss function were all set
to one. All experiments are conducted using PyTorch on a
workstation with Titan XP GPUs.
2) Databases: In addition to our WFFD database, we
have used two publicly available 3D face spoofing databases
- namely 3DMAD [3] (the most widely-used) and HKBU-
MARs-V1+ [19] (with hyper-real 3D masks). As both
databases contain videos of 300 frames (3DMAD with 255
videos and HKBU-MARs-V1+ with 180), 20 frames were
7TABLE III
COMPARISON RESULTS (%) OF DIFFERENT COLOR SPACES ON WFFD DATABASE UNDER PROTOCOL III
Color space Backbone-VGG-16 Backbone-ResNet50Accuracy APCER BPCER ACER Accuracy APCER BPCER ACER
RGB 93.26 8.91 4.57 6.74 93.59 8.91 3.91 6.41
YCbCr 92.39 8.26 6.96 7.61 93.91 8.70 3.48 6.09
YUV 87.83 11.09 13.26 12.18 92.93 9.78 4.35 7.07
HSV 87.07 16.30 9.57 12.94 91.74 10.65 5.87 8.26
YUV+YCbCr 91.09 10.87 6.96 8.92 93.37 5.87 7.39 6.63
RGB+HSV 93.15 8.26 5.43 6.85 93.91 6.30 5.87 6.09
RGB+YUV 94.24 7.17 4.35 5.76 94.89 5.87 4.35 5.11
RGB+YCbCr (MC FBC) 94.57 6.09 4.78 5.44 95.22 5.65 3.91 4.78
randomly selected for spoofing detection. The averaged scores
of these frames were computed as the final score. We have
followed the leave-one-out cross-validation (LOOCV) protocol
settings for the two databases as previous works did [11], [19],
[35]. We have conducted 20 rounds of LOOCV with each
round randomly selecting 10 subjects for training and 6 for
validation on 3DMAD, while 5 for training and 6 for validation
on HKBU-MARs-V1+ database. To validate the generalization
property, we also considered two 2D face spoofing databases
with both printed photo attacks and replayed video attacks:
MSU-USSA [58] and Oulu-NPU database [59]. MSU-USSA
database was specifically created to simulate face spoofing
attacks with diversities of environment, image quality, and
acquisition devices. It consists of 9,000 images (1,000 live
subject and 8,000 spoofing attack) recorded with two types
of cameras. A five-fold subject-exclusive cross validation
protocol was designed for this database. Oulu-NPU database
contains 4,950 videos of 55 subjects with both real access and
2D face spoofing attacks. The videos were recorded using six
mobile devices in three sessions with different illumination
conditions, and they were divided into three subsets for
training, validation, and testing, with four protocols.
3) Evaluation metrics: We report all experimental results
following the ISO/IEC 30107-3 metrics [1]. Three types
of errors, i.e., Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate
(APCER), Bona Fide Presentation Classification Error Rate
(BPCER), and Average Classification Error Rate (ACER) are
used in addition to the detection accuracy.
B. Ablation Studies
1) Impact of multiple color spaces: We first demonstrate
the effectiveness of combining multiple color spaces in de-
tecting wax figure faces from real ones on the WFFD dataset.
Table III shows the comparison results under Protocol III
with two features both from the same color space (including
RGB, YCbCr, YUV, and HSV) and from two different color
spaces as the input of FBC module. It can be observed
that using single color space, RGB and YCbCr get higher
classification accuracy and lower error rates than YUV and
HSV color space. However, using multiple color spaces, espe-
cially combining the RGB space with YCbCr space, obtains
better results. Specifically, the proposed MC FBC scheme
combining RGB and YCbCr color spaces achieved 94.57%
accuracy and 5.44% ACER under the VGG-16 model, while
the performance was further improved by the deeper ResNet-
TABLE IV
COMPARISON RESULTS (%) OF DIFFERENT FUSION METHODS ON WFFD
DATABASE UNDER PROTOCOL III USING VGG-16
Fusion scheme Accuracy APCER BPCER ACER
Original VGG-16 84.68 13.48 17.17 15.33
Concatenation 84.35 13.91 17.39 15.65
BP [48] 92.28 7.61 7.83 7.72
CBP [49] 90.87 8.48 9.78 9.13
FBC [51] 92.83 8.70 5.65 7.18
FBC FL 93.26 8.91 4.57 6.74
MC FBC CE 93.91 7.39 4.79 6.09
MC FBC 94.57 6.09 4.78 5.44
FL denotes Focal Loss, and CE denotes Cross Entropy Loss.
50 model, with the highest accuracy of 95.22% and the lowest
ACER of 4.78%. This shows the complementary properties of
RGB and YCbCr spaces in generating more discriminative
representations.
2) Exploring different feature fusion schemes: We next
compare the proposed MC FBC scheme with several feature
fusion schemes, including concatenation (simply combining
two feature vectors by concatenating them), traditional bilinear
pooling (BP) [48], compact bilinear pooling (CBP) [49], and
factorized bilinear coding (FBC) [51]. As all these bilinear
pooling based methods fused features from VGG-16 model,
we present the comparison results in Table IV using VGG-16
network as the backbone. We can see that without bilinear
pooling fusion, the learned features from VGG-16 model
achieved higher ACER of over 15%, while bilinear pooling
based methods with richer information improved the detection
performance obviously, all rising the classification accuracy
by over six percentage points and reducing the ACER by half.
The FBC method achieved better results than the traditional
BP and CBP methods due to its more compact and discrimi-
native representations based on sparse coding to overcome the
redundancy and burstiness issues of BP. We also present the
comparison results of the focal loss function in the proposed
MC FBC scheme with the cross-entropy loss used in the origi-
nal FBC. For both the two schemes, the focal loss can improve
the detection results in terms of classification accuracy and
error rates thanks to its generalization and robustness by giving
more focus on hard and misclassified examples. Overall, the
proposed MC FBC scheme achieved the highest accuracy and
lowest error rates (except the BPCER) on the Protocol III of
the WFFD database.
8TABLE V
COMPARISON RESULTS (%) ON THE WFFD DATABASE
Method Protocol I Protocol II Protocol III
EER APCER BPCER ACER EER APCER BPCER ACER EER APCER BPCER ACER
Multi-scale LBP [3] 23.50 27.00 28.50 27.75 31.15 36.15 27.69 31.92 28.91 31.74 25.65 28.70
Image quality [60] 35.50 30.50 39.50 35.00 38.85 39.23 43.46 41.35 41.30 36.96 43.26 40.11
Color LBP [52] 31.50 36.00 28.50 32.25 33.85 30.77 39.61 35.19 31.52 33.26 34.13 33.70
Haralick features [9] 30.50 27.50 32.50 30.00 32.69 33.08 36.54 34.81 34.78 28.04 40.00 34.02
Recod [61] 17.00 25.50 14.50 20.00 22.69 25.77 30.77 28.27 21.30 23.91 20.22 22.07
ResNet-50 [62] 16.50 21.00 18.50 19.75 17.31 19.23 21.92 20.58 15.87 17.61 20.43 19.02
VGG-16 [56] 14.50 14.50 18.00 16.25 18.08 13.46 15.77 14.61 14.78 13.48 17.17 15.33
CCoLBP [63] 29.50 26.50 26.00 26.25 28.08 24.62 34.23 29.42 28.04 26.52 29.13 27.83
Noise model [64] 31.00 31.00 48.50 39.75 41.54 41.54 41.15 41.35 38.00 38.04 47.83 42.93
Hybrid ResNet [65] 8.50 9.00 13.00 11.00 11.00 11.38 13.31 12.35 10.90 11.21 13.23 12.22
Human-based - 20.14 11.86 16.00 - 32.97 17.97 25.47 - 27.39 15.31 21.35
MC FBC-VGG-16 5.28 4.35 6.96 5.66 7.34 11.53 4.23 7.88 5.32 6.09 4.78 5.44
MC FBC-ResNet50 4.82 4.00 5.50 4.75 6.55 7.30 6.54 6.92 4.70 5.65 3.91 4.78
C. Comparison on the proposed databases
1) WFFD database: Several face PAD methods were eval-
uated and compared on the WFFD database to show how they
can work for super-realistic 3D presentation attacks. These
PAD methods have achieved promising performance in detect-
ing 2D type or 3D mask presentation attacks. Our benchmark
set includes multi-scale LBP [3], image quality assessment
based [60], color LBP [52], Haralick features [9], Recod
method with outstanding performance in a face spoofing
detection competition [61], ResNet-50 based [62], VGG-16
based [56], Chromatic Co-Occurrence of LBP (CCoLBP) [63],
noise modeling based [64], and Hybrid ResNet [65]. The
experimental results of all benchmark methods were obtained
using the publicly available codes. In addition, we have
conducted a controlled human-based detection experiment to
test the ability of human vision systems in distinguishing wax
figure faces from real ones. In our controlled experiment, 20
volunteers (10 men and 10 women, aged between 23 and 55)
were asked to determine whether the face is real or not using
our self-developed program. The classification error rates were
calculated and averaged as the final result of human-based
spoofing detection.
Table V compares the results of different face PAD schemes.
For Protocol I, we can see that existing face PAD methods
for 2D or 3D mask attacks suffered from severe performance
degradation with high detection error rates on WFFD, ranging
from 8.5% to 48.5%. We attribute the poor performance to
high diversity and super-realistic attacks in the new database.
Among them, most learned features [61], [62], [56], [65]
achieved better result than hand-crafted features [3], [60],
[52], [9]. Human-based detection has achieved a relatively
lower ACER of 16%, but with higher APCER than BPCER,
suggesting that more wax figure faces were mistaken for real
ones. Our proposed MC FBC scheme achieved the best results
with ACER less than 6% for both two backbone networks.
Similar performance differences can be observed under the
Protocol II. However, most algorithms achieved higher error
rates for this protocol. Such results are reasonable since
recording real faces and wax figure faces in the same scenario
with the same camera results in less difference between real
and fake faces. Therefore, it is more difficult to detect the
(a) (b)
Fig. 9. The failure cases with high probabilities, (a) in the proposed MC FBC method (with over 80% of the detection results from 20 randomly chosen
epochs using two backbone networks); (b) in human based anti-spoofing detection (with over 80% of the 20 volunteers). Note that images with red dots are
wax figure faces (but mistaken for real faces), while images with green dots are real faces (but mistaken for wax faces).
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COMPARISON RESULTS (%) ON THE WFFD-V DATABASE
Method Deepfakes 3D Overall
APCER APCER APCER BPCER ACER
Color LBP [52] 33.33 17.50 23.88 24.24 24.06
Haralick [9] 48.15 20.00 31.34 33.33 32.34
Recod [61] 33.33 20.00 25.37 33.33 29.35
ResNet-50 [62] 33.33 12.50 20.89 21.21 21.05
VGG-16 [56] 22.22 25.00 23.88 24.24 24.06
CcoLBP [63] 37.04 22.50 28.36 30.30 29.33
Noise model [64] 25.92 32.50 29.85 30.30 30.08
Hy-ResNet [65] 16.25 12.04 14.55 16.28 15.42
BP [48] 4.17 5.60 5.02 12.58 8.80
FBC [51] 1.39 2.50 2.24 14.39 8.32
MC FBC-
VGG-16
0.31 0.93 0.63 10.23 5.43
MC FBC-
ResNet50
2.78 3.75 3.36 6.82 5.09
3D denotes ‘3D face reconstruction’.
presentation attacks in this homogeneous setting.
The overall results under the Protocol III with different
face PAD methods have large differences, with the error
rates ranging from 3.91% to 47.83%. The best ACER was
achieved in the proposed ResNet-50 based MC FBC scheme
due to the highly discriminative features, which significantly
outperformed other algorithms and human based detection.
Using two variants of the residual learning framework, the
method [65] also achieved better results, with all error rates
lower than 14%. Human-based detection performs worse than
machine-based for all three protocols, which implies that real
vs. wax detection is nontrivial for layperson. The image quality
based [60], and noise modeling based [64] methods, however,
performed worse on the WFFD because of the high diversity
of image qualities in the proposed database.
2) Failure case analysis: Based on the detection results
on WFFD, we further analyze the failure cases in order to
achieve a deeper understanding. In Fig. 9, we have shown the
failure cases with high probabilities in both MC FBC method
and human-based detection results, which visually illustrate
the challenges with distinguishing between fake faces and real
ones even for human observers. From Fig. 9(a), we note that
most false detections with high probabilities in the proposed
MC FBC method trend to have special face poses, which on
the contrary may become the cues for human to detect. More
interestingly, when compared against the proposed method,
human based detection was more likely to mistake wax figure
faces for real ones for both protocols, as shown in Fig. 9(b)
(there are more red dots than green dots). This is in sharp
contrast with that in machine-based method in Fig. 9(a) (there
are nearly the same number of total green and red dots).
3) WFFD-V database: To detect animated wax figure faces
in WFFD-V database, we have randomly selected 10 frames
from each video and the resulting scores from the Softmax
classifier were averaged to obtain the final score. Table VI
shows that all methods achieved higher BPCER than ACPER
TABLE VII
COMPARISON RESULTS (%) ON 3DMAD DATABASE
Method APCER BPCER ACER
Haralick [9] 0.00± 0.0 0.00± 0.0 0.00± 0.0
Recod [61] 4.70± 19.4 0.00± 0.0 2.35± 9.7
ResNet-50 [62] 0.00± 0.0 0.00± 0.0 0.00± 0.0
VGG-16 [56] 14.21± 16.7 3.33± 8.5 9.59± 11.2
GrPPG [66] - - 13.3± 13.3*
LrPPG [15] - - 8.57± 13.3 *
Deep dynamic
textures [11]
- - 1.76*
BP [48] 0.00± 0.0 0.00± 0.0 0.00± 0.0
FBC [51] 0.00± 0.0 1.25± 3.5 0.61± 1.8
MC FBC-
VGG-16
0.00± 0.0 0.00± 0.0 0.00± 0.0
MC FBC-
ResNet50
0.00± 0.0 0.00± 0.0 0.00± 0.0
* Using reported results.
TABLE VIII
COMPARISON RESULTS (%) ON HKBU-MARS-V1+ DATABASE
Method APCER BPCER ACER
ColorLBP [52] 24.00± 36.5 9.71± 9.8 16.72± 20.2
Haralick [9] 3.86± 7.6 2.43± 3.8 3.24± 6.8
Recod [61] 17.14± 27.2 15.71± 27.4 16.53± 28.7
ResNet-50 [62] 17.14± 29.2 15.71± 26.9 16.43± 28.1
VGG-16 [56] 16.33± 37.8 7.10± 11.2 13.66± 19.8
CcoLBP [63] 14.28± 34.1 12.85± 30.0 13.57± 31.9
GrPPG [66] - - 16.10± 20.5*
LrPPG [15] - - 8.67± 8.8 *
Deep dynamic
textures [11]
- - 13.44 *
BP [48] 9.09± 30.2 3.55± 11.8 6.32± 15.6
FBC [51] 9.09± 30.2 2.64± 8.7 5.86± 15.3
MC FBC-
VGG-16
8.33± 28.87 0.00± 0.0 4.17± 14.4
MC FBC-
ResNet50
7.27± 24.1 0.00± 0.0 3.64± 12.1
* Using reported results. Note that the result of ’Deep dynamic textures’ was
conducted on a subset of HKBU-MARs-V1+.
due to more fake faces than real faces on this database. The
proposed method achieved the best performance with an over-
all ACER of 5.43% using VGG-16 and 5.09% using ResNet-
50 network. The last four rows of Table demonstrate the
effect of multiple color spaces fusion in further improving the
detection results. In addition, the proposed method performed
better in detecting wax faces in videos generated by Deepfake
than by 3D reconstruction technique. This can be attributed
to the higher image quality of the 3D reconstructed videos
(similar to the real ones) than the Deepfake-based videos. By
contrast, the Haralick features [9] obtained an overall ACER
over 30%, and performed the worst in distinguishing between
wax figure face videos and real face ones.
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TABLE IX
COMPARISON RESULTS (%) ON MSU-USSA DATABASE
Method APCER BPCER ACER
Color LBP [52] 3.1± 0.8 3.0± 0.8 3.1± 0.8
Image distortion [58] 3.3± 0.7 4.3± 2.0 3.5± 1.0
Haralick [9] 9.1± 0.9 8.8± 0.9 8.9± 0.9
Recod [61] 3.3± 0.4 3.4± 1.3 3.3± 0.7
ResNet-50 [62] 7.6± 0.9 8.9± 2.6 8.3± 1.0
VGG-16 [56] 27.7± 5.5 27.8± 2.2 27.8± 3.5
Patch-CNN [67] - - 0.4± 0.3*
Depth-CNN [67] - - 2.2± 0.7*
Two stream CNN [67] - - 0.2± 0.2*
Deep forest [68] - - 1.3± 0.5*
MC FBC-VGG-16 1.0± 0.5 2.9± 1.0 1.9± 0.5
MC FBC-ResNet50 1.5± 0.5 1.6± 0.9 1.5± 0.4
* Using reported results.
D. Intra-database testing on existing databases
1) 3D mask spoofing databases: The spoofing detection
results on 3DMAD and HKBU-MARs-V1+ databases are
shown in Tables VII and VIII. Besides the previous benchmark
set, we include three face PAD methods proposed for 3D
mask spoofing detection- namely, two heartbeat signal based
methods using global or local rPPG-spectrum features [66],
[15], and the deep dynamic textures based method [11].
Without publicly available codes, we have directly cited the
reported results under the same protocol. It can be seen that
the proposed MC FBC method achieved 0% error rates on
3DMAD database, where several methods performed perfectly.
Note that this is because 3DMAD is a relatively easy dataset
for spoofing detection (with simple and rigid masks as shown
in Fig. 3). On more realistic HKBU-MARs-V1+ database,
our method achieved 3.64% ACER using ResNet-50 as the
backbone network, slightly higher than the best result from
Haralick features (with 3.24%). We can also observe that all
methods have achieved higher error rates on HKBU-MARs-
V1+ (see Table VIII) than on 3DMAD database (see Table
VII). Such results are reasonable because the masks spoofing
samples in the HKBU-MARs-V1+ are closer to real faces
and contain more realistic variations. Based on heartbeat
signal analysis, the methods using GrPPG [66] and LrPPG
festures [15] were affected little by the spoofing qualities,
showing better detection robustness on the two databases.
2) 2D face spoofing databases: Tables IX and X show
the comparison results on the 2D face spoofing databases
(MSU-USSA and Oulu-NPU). In Table IX, we also include
two new methods on MSU-USSA database, including two-
stream CNN in [67] combining Patch-CNN and depth-CNN,
and deep forest with multi-scale LBP based method [68].
The proposed MC FBC method has achieved the ACER of
1.9% and 1.5% using two backbone networks (VGG-16 and
ResNet50) respectively, slightly higher than deep forest based
method (with ACER of 1.3%). Using not only full face images,
but also local patches extracted from the same face, the two-
stream CNN method performed the best with 0.2% ACER in
distinguishing the fake from real faces.
For the widely-used Oulu-NPU database, we have added
several benchmark methods, including two leading methods
in face spoofing detection competition held in 2017 [61]
(GRADIANT and MixedFAXNet), the MILHP [69] based
on multiple instantialized local homographic parameteriza-
tion, DeepPixeBiS [70] with deep pixel-wise supervision,
TSCNN [71] using two-stream CNN, and SAPLC [72] based
on spatial aggregation of pixel-level local classifiers. The pro-
posed MC FBC method based on ResNet-50 model achieved
ACERs of 5.9%, 3.8%, 4.9%, and 7.6% in four protocols
respectively, only slightly lower than using VGG-16 as the
backbone network. The SAPLC [72] method achieved superior
performance to most methods under the first three protocols
with limited variations. This can be attributed to the combina-
tion of a fully convolutional neural network with foreground
mask and shallow neural network aggregation techniques.
Although the performance of our proposed MC FBC method
was not the best under Protocol I with unseen environmental
conditions, it has shown good robustness (ranking the second,
slightly lower than the best result of noise model based
method [64]) under Protocol IV, which combines the previous
three protocols and is the most challenging scenario. Overall,
even though the proposed method is designed for 3D face anti-
spoofing, it is still highly competitive when compared with the
state-of-the-art methods in detecting 2D face spoofing attacks.
E. Inter-database testing
To study the generalization property against unseen attacks,
we have conducted inter-database evaluation on both the new
WFFD database and existing mask spoofing databases. We
first show how well existing methods can perform in detecting
“alive” wax figure faces using the still wax figure faces as the
training set. The face images in the training subset (2760) in
WFFD were used for training, and all 310 videos (each with
10 frames) in WFFD-V dataset were used for testing. Table XI
shows larger differences with the overall ACER in the range
of 11.50% to 59.57% among different detection methods (also
including two video manipulation detection methods [73],
[74]). The last four rows show the effectiveness of bilinear
pooling fusion on improving the performance.
The proposed method demonstrates the best generalizability
with the lowest ACER of 16.48% and 11.50% using the
VGG-16 and ResNet-50 models respectively. We attribute
the outstanding performance to the complementary features
learned by the proposed method. The video manipulation
detection method based on warping artifacts [73] achieved
0% error rate in detecting Deepfake videos, but at the price
of the highest error rate in detecting 3D reconstruction based
wax figure face videos. Another deep learning based video
manipulation detection model MesoNet [74] also demonstrated
unbalanced performance with the lowest BPCER but highest
APCER values. Similar to Table VI, most methods performed
better in detecting wax faces in videos generated by Deepfake
than by 3D reconstruction technique due to image quality
differences.
We have further compared the generalizability of the pro-
posed method to unseen 3D mask spoofing attacks. For a fair
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TABLE X
COMPARISON RESULTS (%) ON OULU-NPU DATABASE
Method Protocol I Protocol II Protocol III Protocol IV
AP BP ACER AP BP ACER APCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER
Color LBP [52] 5.0 20.8 12.9 22.5 6.7 14.6 14.2± 9.2 8.6± 5.9 11.4± 4.6 29.2± 37.5 23.3± 13.3 26.3± 16.9
GRADIANT [61] 1.3 12.5 6.9 3.1 1.9 2.5 2.6± 3.9 5.0± 5.3 3.8± 2.4 5.0± 4.5 15.0± 7.1 10.0± 5.0
MixedFASNet [61] 0.0 17.5 8.8 9.7 2.5 6.1 5.3± 6.7 7.8± 5.5 6.5± 4.6 10.0± 7.7 35.8± 26.7 22.9± 15.2
Recod [61] 3.3 13.3 8.3 15.8 4.2 10.0 10.1± 13.9 8.9± 9.3 9.5± 6.7 35.0± 37.5 10.0± 4.5 22.5± 18.2
Noise model [64] 1.2 1.7 1.5 4.2 4.4 4.3 4.0± 1.8 3.8± 1.2 3.6± 1.6 5.1± 6.3 6.1± 5.1 5.6± 5.7
MILHP [69] 8.3 0.8 4.6 5.6 5.3 5.4 1.5± 1.2 6.4± 6.6 4.0± 2.9 15.8± 12.8 8.3± 15.7 12.0± 6.2
DeepPixBiS [70] 0.8 0.0 0.4 11.4 0.6 6.0 11.7± 19.6 10.6± 14.1 11.1± 9.4 36.7± 29.7 13.3± 16.8 25.0± 12.7
TSCNN [71] 5.1 6.7 5.9 7.6 2.2 4.9 3.9± 2.8 7.3± 1.1 5.6± 1.6 11.3± 3.9 9.7± 4.8 9.8± 4.2
SAPLC [72] 0.0 0.8 0.4 2.8 2.2 2.5 4.7± 4.2 3.1± 3.5 3.9± 2.1 11.9± 6.9 6.7± 5.5 9.3± 4.4
MC FBC-VGG-16 5.7 8.7 7.2 5.1 3.3 4.2 2.9± 3.8 9.9± 8.9 6.5± 4.7 6.3± 5.8 10.5± 10.9 8.8± 5.9
MC FBC-ResNet50 3.5 8.3 5.9 3.3 4.2 3.8 3.4± 3.5 6.3± 4.2 4.9± 3.7 5.8± 4.5 9.4± 9.3 7.6± 5.4
All using reported results. ‘AP’ denotes ‘APCER’, and ‘BP’ denotes ‘BPCER’.
TABLE XI
INTER-DATABASE TESTING RESULTS (%) ON WFFD-V DATABASE
Method Deepfakes 3D Overall
APCER APCER APCER BPCER ACER
Color LBP [52] 44.00 24.80 32.00 58.71 45.36
Haralick [9] 16.00 36.80 29.00 56.88 42.94
Recod [61] 29.33 38.40 35.00 33.94 34.47
ResNet-50 [62] 37.33 34.40 35.50 35.78 35.64
VGG-16 [56] 42.67 69.60 59.50 59.63 59.57
CcoLBP [63] 18.67 17.60 18.00 55.96 36.98
Noise model[64] 17.33 18.40 18.00 53.21 35.61
Warping artifacts[73] 0 91.20 57.00 55.05 56.02
MesoNet [74] 50.67 82.40 70.50 6.42 38.46
BP [48] 18.33 20.30 19.56 27.52 23.54
FBC [51] 6.50 11.00 9.31 32.91 21.11
MC FBC-VGG-16 14.67 17.50 16.44 16.51 16.48
MC FBC-ResNet50 7.33 8.00 7.63 15.37 11.50
3D denotes ‘3D face reconstruction’.
comparison, we have followed the protocols in [35], [19]:
training on 3DMAD uses random 8 subjects, training on
HKBU-MARs-V1+ uses 6 subjects, and both testing uses all
subjects. Besides the previous benchmark methods, the latest
3D mask PAD method based on temporal similarity of rPPG
(TSrPPG) [19] is added to the benchmark set. Results in Table
XII have justified the robustness of the MC FBC method, with
the second lowest ACER using ResNet-50 as backbone under
both inter-database test settings, while the VGG-16 based
MC FBC performed slightly worse than ResNet-50 model.
Most methods have achieved higher error rates using 3DMAD
as the training set. The underlying reason is that this database
contains less variations in the collected data than the HKBU-
MARs-V1+ database. Therefore, the models optimized for this
database are not able to generalize well in new acquisition
conditions. Due to the good generalizability of liveness cues,
the TSrPPG method [19] has achieved the best results using
heartbeat signal in the time domain.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
To detect realistic 3D face presentation attacks, we have
proposed to generate discriminative representations in a fine-
grained manner and combine complementary information in
multiple color spaces by bilinear coding in this paper. The pro-
posed approach fuses complementary features from two color
spaces (RGB vs. YCbCr) extracted via CNN models (VGG-16
and ResNet-50) using factorized bilinear coding. We have also
constructed a database (WFFD) composed of wax figure faces
containing both images and videos with high diversity and
large subject size as super-realistic face presentation attacks.
Both codes and databases will be made publicly available to
facilitate the improvement and evaluation of different PAD
algorithms. Extensive experimental results have demonstrated
the superior performance of the proposed method in detecting
real faces from wax figure faces to not only several existing
PAD methods but also human-based spoofing detection. Our
method has achieved competitive performance on other 3D
mask and 2D face spoofing databases in both intra-database
and inter-database testing scenarios.
It should be noted that the best performance under inter-
database testing achieved by the proposed scheme still has
the error rate of over 10%. How to improve the detection
performance deserves further investigation. Super-realistic face
spoofing attacks are indeed difficult to distinguish from real
ones even for humans. We envision that learning-based meth-
ods, when combined with liveness cues, is a promising direc-
tion to provide effective and generalized spoofing detection in
the future. However, as AI technologies keeps advancing at a
fast pace, it is likely that more challenging spoofing attacks
such as Deepfake will become more powerful. As many people
believe, the arm races between spoofing and anti-spoofing will
never end.
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TABLE XII
INTER-DATABASE TESTING RESULTS (%) ON 3DMAD AND HKBU-MARS-V1+ DATABASES
Method 3DMAD → HKBU-MARs-V1+ HKBU-MARs-V1+ → 3DMAD
APCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER
Multi-scale LBP [3] 45.00± 2.9 43.93± 2.9 44.46± 2.9 28.76± 5.9 28.62± 5.8 28.69± 5.9
Color LBP [52] 40.00± 2.0 39.29± 2.5 39.64± 2.2 34.70± 4.5 34.26± 4.8 34.48± 4.7
Haralick [9] 30.62± 5.9 29.64± 5.7 30.13± 5.8 21.47± 3.8 21.18± 3.6 21.32± 3.7
ResNet-50 [62] 36.00± 8.4 35.14± 8.0 35.57± 8.2 23.35± 8.9 23.06± 9.2 23.21± 9.1
Recod [61] 32.50± 4.6 31.07± 3.9 31.78± 4.2 26.35± 1.4 22.09± 5.5 24.22± 2.7
VGG-16 [56] 32.50± 5.0 31.78± 4.5 32.14± 3.4 52.71± 3.7 40.47± 2.9 48.09± 2.4
GrPPG [66] - - 46.70± 3.0 - - 31.50± 3.8
LrPPG [15] - - 39.20± 0.8 - - 40.40± 2.7
TSrPPG [19] - - 23.50± 0.5 - - 16.10± 1.0
BP [48] 48.08± 15.2 19.86± 22.7 33.97± 5.5 26.54± 9.2 36.07± 10.5 31.31± 3.0
FBC [51] 34.75± 9.9 21.19± 18.2 27.97± 4.6 29.95± 8.1 25.00± 12.0 27.50± 3.7
MC FBC-VGG-16 26.25± 0.2 25.36± 9.5 25.80± 9.4 22.79± 3.9 20.96± 2.0 22.90± 4.4
MC FBC-ResNet50 25.00± 2.0 25.78± 3.8 25.39± 2.7 18.57± 3.6 16.10± 2.6 17.34± 3.0
3D denotes ‘3D face reconstruction’.
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